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CRIMINAL LAW
ARISTOTLE'S PARADOX AND THE SELF-
INCRIMINATION PUZZLE
GEORGE C. THOMAS I* AND
MARSHALL D. BILDER**
Law both punishes and protects what our culture defines as
choice. The importance of choice as an organizing metaphor in our
moral and legal culture has been recognized for centuries. Plato at-
tributed to humans "an element of free choice, which makes us, and
not Heaven, responsible for the good and evil in our lives."' Aris-
totle devoted a book of his Ethics to choice and blameworthiness. 2
The criminal law follows Plato and Aristotle by presupposing that
members of society are autonomous actors who can be punished for
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choosing to act in certain ways.3 Conversely, criminal law does not
assign blame for unchosen conduct.
The classic example of unchosen conduct is when the actor's
volition is not involved in any way-for example, P pushes S. Since
the criminal law has long provided that S commits no crime in the
absence of a volitional act,4 he would not be criminally responsible
for any harm resulting from P's push. Exempting nonvolitional acts
from liability is not controversial, 5 but extending this exemption to
compelled volitional acts 6 is more problematic.
The concept "compelled volitional act" is, at one level, a para-
dox. "Compelled" implies that the act is not the product of the ac-
tor's will, yet "volitional" presumes an exercise of will.7 One
solution to the paradox is to reject the premise that "compelled"
necessarily means that the actor's will is completely uninvolved.
One might decide to commit a self-harming act in order to avoid a
greater harm, and still make a valid claim that the act was against
one's will.8 As Aristotle noted, however, this distinction is itself par-
adoxical: "Such acts, then, are voluntary; but perhaps in a general
way they are involuntary, since no one would choose any such act of
itself."9 Where is the line at which a volitional act becomes com-
pelled? Consider Don Locke's view that there is "some reason to
insist" that a bank teller acts freely when he surrenders the bank's
money to a robber in order to avoid being shot. "It is his decision
and his decision alone whether to hand over the funds or risk his
life, and which he does will depend on him, his wishes and prefer-
3 See, e.g., R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAw (1927) (not-
ing that criminal law historically "postulates a free agent confronted with a choice be-
tween doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong") (quoted in
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952)). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *20-21 ("the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do
or to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human actions either
praiseworthy or culpable").
4 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01. To be sure, the MODEL PENAL CODE also cre-
ates criminal liability for the failure to act in certain narrow circumstances. See id. at
§ 2.01(1) & (3). But this is irrelevant to the point in the text because the failure to act
must also be "volitional"-one must be physically capable of performing the omitted
act. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 208-09 (2d ed. 1986).
5 See D. HusAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 90-93 (1987) (noting that the contro-
versy arises in deciding whether the theory of denying liability comes from the lack of
actus reus or mens rea).
6 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (creating defense of duress for volitional acts).
7 The MODEL PENAL CODE, for example, implicitly defines "volitional act" as a "bod-
ily movement" that is "a product of the effort or determination of the actor." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d).
8 See, e.g., Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in NoMos XIV COERCION, 32 & 34 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman ed. 1972) (arguing that the only unfree choices are those that avoid evil).
9 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at § 1.
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ences, not on anyone else, not even on the [robber]." 10
Compulsion is at the heart of the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment, which provides that "[n]o person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
.... ."I I Because testimony is inherently volitional, Aristotle's para-
dox applies here to create interpretive problems that are insur-
mountable if "volitional" and "compelled" are both given robust
meanings. Dean Wigmore illustrated the interpretive difficulty with
a colorful example: "As between the rack and a false confession, the
latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is
nonetheless voluntary."' 2 Yet how can a choice to avoid the rack or
a robber's bullet be voluntary?
Perhaps there are "clear" cases of compulsion and equally
"clear" cases of free choice. The threat of the rack may be a clear
case of compulsion despite the theoretical existence of a choice.
Conversely, a person would seem to have made a free choice when,
without prompting, he walks into a police station and confesses.
Moving away from these clear cases, however, the question of
testimonial choice becomes hopelessly entangled in Aristotle's para-
dox.'8 Yes, the police (P) pressured suspect (S) to answer ques-
tions; yes, S was influenced by P's pressure; but S chose to answer
when she could have remained silent. The paradoxical nature of
volitional-but-compelled testimony explains why the self-incrimina-
tion clause continues to puzzle courts and commentators.
1 4
10 LOCKE, THREE CONCEPTS OF FREE ACTION: I, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 109 (J.
Fischer ed. 1986).
11 U.S. Const. amend. V.
12 See 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EvIDENCE at § 824 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]; see also id. ("[a]ll conscious utterances are and must be volun-
tary"); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 882
(1979) ("[r]egardless of the severity of tortures" officials cannot "obtain a confession
without defendant's choice to confess").
13 y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 522 (6th ed.
1986) (noting that, in one sense, all confessions are voluntary and, in another sense,
almost none are).
14 See Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POL-
ICY 25 (1980) (exhorting courts to "scrap the 'voluntariness' terminology altogether");
Dripps, Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988) (concluding that "[n]ot since the period separating Escobedo
v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona have so many said so much about confessions") (foot-
notes omitted). See also Gerstein, Punishment and Self-Incrimination, 16 AM.J.JURis. 84, 84
(1971) (noting that Supreme Court opinions "when they do make an effort in the direc-
tion of a justification for the privilege, generally offer a grab-bag of diverse reasons and
vaguely articulated principles which do no more than suggest the existence of some
more fundamental unarticulated major premise"); Grano, supra note 12, at 863 (noting
"intolerable uncertainty... of the due process voluntariness doctrine in the law of con-
fessions"); Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 869-72 (1981)
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Aristotle's view that volitional acts take on the characteristics of
non-volitional acts when "no one would choose any such act of it-
self"'15 is one way of identifying volitional-but-compelled conduct.
Indeed, "choice" seems a particularly good metaphor for the pro-
tection of the self-incrimination clause; 16 testimony is one of the
most carefully considered of all human actions.' 7 We thus begin
this paper with the premise that testimony is compelled when S does
not choose to testify. Two problems immediately arise. First, defin-
ing compulsion as lack of choice does not provide self-evident an-
swers to Aristotle's paradox. Second, a complex of social, political,
philosophical, and psychological forces produced the self-incrimina-
tion clause; any explanation limited to only the philosophical dimen-
sion of this complex is likely to be unsatisfying in some respects.
Thus, we do not consider "choice" a self-evident "deep structure"
that explains everything about the self-incrimination clause.
Instead, we will present a "choice" explanation of the self-in-
crimination clause as a way of thinking about what the clause should
protect. Our definition of choice will avoid Aristotle's paradox by
rejecting a robust reading of "volitional." We will argue that some
decisions to speak are unchosen because they result from desires
created by external forces, desires that are not part of internally-
derived volition. This requires maintaining a distinction between
volition and desire.' 8 It may be that humans choose their volition
but not their desires.
(cataloguing "six defects in the due process voluntariness test," id. at 869); Van Kessel,
The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Ap-
proaches, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 6 (1986) (recent explanations "often rehash old arguments
and positions rather than propose new ideas or solutions.").
15 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at § 1.
16 Although other commentators have identified choice as the essential value pro-
tected by the self-incrimination clause, no one has (to our knowledge) sought to de-
scribe the clause's protection solely as that of choice. See, e.g., Arenella, Schmerber and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRM. L. REV. 31, 48-56 (1982);
Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEx.
L. REV. 231, 289 (1988); Grano, supra note 12, at 879; Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation
and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IowA L. REV. 975, 989 & n.55 (1986); Uvil-
ler, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of
Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1153 (1987); Westen & Mandell, To Talk, to
Balk, or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred Response," 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 521, 521 (1982).
17 To be sure, the focus of this paper is on statements made in the course of police
interrogation, and "testimony" made to a police officer may not be as carefully chosen
as courtroom testimony. Still, if suspects know they have been arrested for a crime, their
responses to police questions about that crime would (in the absence of compulsion)
likely be much more carefully chosen than most of the words we speak.




Like all concepts, the meaning of choice is neither static nor
positively determined by the word itself. Instead, human under-
standing of choice is contingent on the metaphors used to represent
reality.19 We will refer to these metaphors as "ideologies. ' 20 In the
context of choice and compulsion, the ideologies are deeply imbed-
ded in our culture and are quite invisible in our ordinary discourse
about the process of making choices. As James Boyle has noted,
"[T]he most powerful ideological constraints are those that are in-
visible; people are unaware that they believe anything at all-it ap-
pears to them that 'things have to be that way.' "21
Consider again S who walked into the police station and con-
fessed. While we posited this as a "dear" case of free choice, is it
still a free choice if S believes God has given him a choice between
confessing and committing suicide?22 There can be no empirical
answer to this question, for the answer requires an ideological judg-
ment about what choice means. Hundreds of articles and notes
have been written about the self-incrimination clause; the debate
has been often heated and sometimes hostile.23 One reason for
these deep divisions is that the thinking of the commentators is usu-
ally bounded by a particular ideology, making communication
across the ideological gulf almost impossible.
Even to posit the existence of compulsion is an ideological
judgment. As Louis Michael Seidman has observed, compulsion en-
tails the premise that there is a difference between "internal hopes,
desires, and beliefs" and "external facts about the world." 24 Under
19 See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALF. L. REv. 1151, 1202 (1985).
20 Some readers cautioned that "ideology" has negative connotations from its use to
describe political theories. We do not use the term in that manner; we use it instead as a
short-hand, value-neutral way to describe cultural assumptions about the process of
making choices. See, e.g., Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743,
761-64 (1987) (applyingJacques Derrida's deconstructive theories to explain ideological
thinking); Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality, 77J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 969, 977 nA2 (1986) (discussing K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
(1936)); Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79
YALE LJ. 359, 359 n.1 (1970).
21 Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 685, 769 (1985).
22 See Colorado v. Connelly, 478 U.S. 157 (1986), discussed infra notes 83-102.
23 See, e.g., Frankel, From Private Fights Toward PublicJustices, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 516, 526
(1976) (describing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as "at best a tense, tempo-
rary, ragged truce between combatants"); Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Per-
spective, 24 AM. CIuM. L. REv. 193, 210 (1987) (noting "storm of controversy" created by
Miranda).
24 Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2
YALEJ. L. & HUMANITIES 149, 151 (1990).
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this view, humans have internal preferences that "exist prior to and
independent of social interaction. ' 25
But another view locates preferences within the community
rather than the individual. In Seidman's words,
Much of modem social science, political theory, philosophy, and liter-
ary theory attempts to demonstrate that desires and beliefs are inevita-
bly intersubjective and social. It is not meaningful to talk about
disembodied preferences. These mental states are always situated
within a culture and molded by forces that make various choices more
or less attractive.
26
According to this "intersubjective" ideology, S's preferences
"are socially constructed, [and] the distinction between internal
hopes and desires and external facts in the world becomes much
more difficult to maintain." 27 An "extreme" version of the intersub-
jective model would posit that S's internal preferences are indistin-
guishable from the external facts in the world. S's preferences
would be wholly contained within any particular social interaction,
and her conduct during the interaction would necessarily represent
her preferences. 28 Indeed, it could be that cultural forces simultane-
ously create human actors and "represent them to the community as
reality." 29 Thus, the extreme version denies the possibility of com-
pulsion as traditionally defined-the overbearing of S's will-be-
cause S's will (indeed, S) does not exist independently of the social
interaction. 30 The extreme version of the intersubjective model also
denies moral responsibility. If S does not exist independently of the
social interaction, then it is incoherent to blame (or praise) S for her
conduct.3 1
25 See id. at 173.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 This assumes that S is the physical source of her conduct. If X moves S's hand
without S's participation, the motion does not represent S's preference.
29 See Boldt, supra note 20, at 1012 (arguing that law "creat[es] social actors who can
be held 'responsible' for their 'choices' ").
30 One could change the definition of compulsion, of course. Perhaps compulsion
means the shaping of preferences. For example, Seidman argues that the now-famous
Miranda warnings are the Supreme Court's effort to construct preferences that are in
accord with the self-incrimination clause. See Seidman, supra note 24, at 174. But the
clause does not prohibit confessions; it only prohibits compulsion. If compulsion is the
shaping of preferences by intersubjective interaction, the Miranda warnings are compul-
sion equally as much as police interrogation. Indeed, the difficulty with the "shaping"
definition of compulsion is that every aspect of social interaction would qualify as a nec-
essary but not sufficient ground for compulsion. (Seidman also concludes, for different
reasons, that the intersubjective reading of Miranda is unsatisfactory. See id).
31 That is not to say that it is irrational; rather, it is arational. If S does not exist
independently of the social interaction, none of us does either. Thus, we "choose" to
punish S as if she (and we) existed independently. But none of us can do any differently,
248 [Vol. 82
ARISTOTLE'S PARADOX
But this is not the ideology that underlies criminal law. Instead,
as Richard Boldt has observed, criminal law ideology "teaches each
community member to view himself or herself as 'the author of his
[or her] actions.' "32 To be sure, this general description of the free
will premise underlying criminal law requires modification to ex-
plain how compulsion can exist. Just as the intersubjective ideology
can imply that no choices are free, an extreme free will model can
imply that all choices are free. Under either of these ideologies,
compulsion could not exist.
Compulsion can exist only if some choices are free and some
are not. The criminal law recognizes compulsion because it has de-
veloped a modified free will premise. S is the author of her conduct
in most cases, but not when her conduct manifests the will of an-
other person-for example, when S commits a crime or confesses
under a threat of death. At some point the modified free will prem-
ise demands that law treat the resulting conduct as belonging to the
actor who applied the pressure rather than the one who engaged in
the conduct. Determining whether S's choice to confess belonged
to her or to the state is, therefore, central to the compulsion
inquiry.83
This is not to say that a concern with choice is the only rationale
that would explain why judges were reluctant to admit confessions
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 4 Judicial reluc-
and the effort ofjudges and academics to justify punishment is simply irrelevant. A less
extreme version of the intersubjective model posits that most (or all) human preferences
are formed by external forces but that humans then have a choice to identify with these
externally-created preferences. See, e.g., H. FRANxFuRT, supra note 18, at 47-57. In that
case, moral responsibility would exist for the instances when S identified with a prefer-
ence created by other forces. See id at 57; Introduction, MoRAL REsPONSIBILIY 12
(Fischer ed. 1986).
32 Boldt, supra note 20, at 979 (quoting R. CowARD &J. ELmiS, LANGUAGE AND MATE-
RLALIsM 77 (1978) (brackets added by Boldt)).
33 See Seidman, supra note 24, at 173 (describing confessions law as presupposing
that suspects have a "fixed preference for silence" and that the "police, representing the
community, have invaded a private, preexisting space that is properly under the domain
of the individual").
34 On early judicial reluctance to admit confessions, see WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 12, at §§ 844-45; Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern
Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 280; McCormick, Some Problems and Develop-
ments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239, 246 (1946). See also infra notes
41-51, and accompanying text. Today, quite to the contrary, confessions are viewed as
the best evidence. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Uviller, supra note 16, at 1139 (characterizing the confession, "[d]espite its hidden
frailty" as "the queen of the evidentiary chessboard"). A confession has the practical
value of linking the defendant to the crime and the metaphysical value of proving the
crime by means of the defendant's decision to "tell the truth." See Grano, Selling the Idea
to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law (Book Review), 84
MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986).
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tance to admit confessions requires explanation since truthful ac-
counts by the suspect are the best evidence of guilt or innocence.
That only truthful accounts are valuable evidence suggests a "relia-
bility" justification for the common law confessions rule. If a con-
fession is unreliable, it does not advance the truth-seeking function
of the criminal justice system and should not be used, quite apart
from whether it was the choice of the suspect.
Thus, the common law confessions rule could have developed
to prevent pressures that might (by some standard of probability)
lead to untrue confessions.a5 Defining this level of pressure is, of
course, difficult. Consider a hypothethical: P arrests S for murder
and then states, "X told me that she saw you kill the victim; if you
tell me the truth now, before this gets more complicated, the district
attorney will be inclined toward leniency." If P is lying about X
identifying S as the killer, P creates some probability of a false con-
fession; whether it is a sufficient probability to justify suppression
under a reliability rationale requires a further judgment.
A third reason to suppress confessions has nothing to do with
choice or reliability. It focuses, instead, on the morality of the pres-
sure applied to S. Under this rationale, confessions collected by
means that society finds abhorrent would be excluded, without in-
quiring into whether S made a free choice or gave a reliable confes-
sion. The normative justification overlaps to a considerable degree
with the reliability justification. For example, everyone would likely
consider torture an improper interrogation technique.3 6 But since
torture would produce a confession that is unreliable in every case, a
normative standard that focused only on the conduct of P would be
quite unnecessary. The difficulty of making a normative judgment
in more routine cases, where it would offer a standard different from
the reliability standard, can be illustrated in our hypothetical.
Should a court suppress S's confession under a normative rationale
if P falsely states that X said she saw S commit the crime? We sug-
gested that the answer was unclear under a reliability rationale. It
might be somewhat more certain here-lying is wrongful, perhaps
even in pursuit of a noble goal such as solving a crime. But what if P
is telling the truth yet has reason to doubt X's credibility? What if P
35 See, e.g., Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo
ST. LJ. 449, 452 (1964) (arguing that the only value advanced by common law confes-
sions rule was to "increase the accuracy of the guilt-determining process"); McCormick,
supra note 34, at 246.
36 See L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFr AMENDMENT 34 (1968) (noting that torture was
illegal in England under the common law).
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is almost, but not quite, certain that X is lying? 7
The reliability and normative justifications for a self-incrimina-
tion principle are rational ways to impose order on the historical
data, but they are no more persuasive than a choice explanation. In
1651, Thomas Hobbes stated that humans have "the Liberty to dis-
obey" the soveraign when it commands even a "justly condemned"
person to "kill, wound, or mayme himselfe."38 From this statement
of the law of self-preservation, Hobbes derived the self-incrimina-
tion principle: "If a man be interrogated by the soveraign, or his
Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound,
without assurance of Pardon, to confesse it; because no man... can
be obliged... to accuse himselfe."
3 9
Hobbes' philosophical position does not seem to entail a con-
cern with either reliability or morality. Indeed, he posits that the
person is "justly condemned" and grants the right to refuse to an-
swer questions in general, not just when the interrogation is im-
proper. Perhaps Hobbes' ideology is part of the ideology of
autonomy--viewing humans as separate from the state and thus en-
titled to choose not to obey the state.40
In any event, Hobbes' position found its way into the common
law at least by 1658 when a court based the right against self-incrim-
ination squarely on the "Law of Nature" that every man should
"preserve himself from hurt and damage."'4 1 Twenty years later,
Matthew Hale's Pleas of the Crown noted that an in-court confes-
sion admitting the truth of the indictment was equivalent to a con-
37 See Grano, supra note 12, at 917 ("With respect to police interrogation, society's
judgment on lying and trickery remains unsettled.").
38 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 21. The limitation of the self-preservation principle to
self-imposed harm explains, for example, why it does not justify a soldier disobeying an
order to charge an enemy position.
39 f&
40 A law of self-preservation is not necessarily limited to choice protection. The right
to be free from self-imposed harm could entail the right not to confess or plead guilty
under any circumstances, which is the Talmudic rule. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, In the
Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U.L. REV. 955, 1048 (1988)
(noting that the "Talmudic rule is simple; it is absolute; it is profound" and "[w]e could
do worse that to look to it for guidance"). See also Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 28 (1981) (suggesting "strongest ver-
sion" of self-preservation principle treats "an individual's self-harming behavior as actu-
ally being immoral"). But Hobbes' formulation of the law of self-preservation gives the
individual the "liberty to disobey" the sovereigu's command to injure himself, sug-
gesting that choice was the value being protected. Moreover, that other entailments are
possible does not discredit choice protection as a plausible entailment.
41 See Attorney General v. Mico, 1 Hardes 137, 139, 145 Eng. Rep. 419, 420 (1658)
(referring to this as the "law of God"). See also G. GILBERT, THE LAw or EVIDENCE BY A
LATE LEARNEDJUDGE, 139-40 (1756) (English law "follows[s] that Law of Nature, which
commands every Man to endeavour his own Preservation").
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viction, "but it is usual for the court.., to advise the party to plead
and put himself upon his trial, and not presently to record his con-
fession, but to admit him to plead." 42 Hale viewed out-of-court
confessions with even more skepticism: "the court will not record
his confession, but admit him to plead to the felony not guilty."' 43
Hale's rules thus prohibited the use of out-of-court confessions,
but only discouraged in-court confessions. The effect of these rules
was that the accused could repeat an out-of-court confession if he
chose to confess in court. Hale's rules seem to manifest Hobbes'
choice ideology more than the normative and reliability justifica-
tions for a self-incrimination principle. The rules are overinclusive
as a way of excluding unreliable confessions or deterring improper
forms of questioning; an out-of-court confession could be both reli-
able and the product of normatively fair state conduct.
The English courts often mirrored Hale's reluctance to admit
even reliable confessions obtained by fair methods. In 1783, the
King's Bench suppressed a confession because an official told the
suspect that if he did not provide "a more satisfactory account," the
official would take him before a magistrate.44 Observing that "[t]oo
great a chastity cannot be preserved on this point" and that "[i]t is
almost impossible to be too careful upon this subject," the court
concluded that "[t]he prisoner was hardly a free agent at the time"
he made the statement.45
The "free agent" concept suggests a choice ideology and also
underlies Parliament's decision in 1848 to codify the nascent com-
mon law rule requiring magistrates to inform defendants that they
need not make any statement at the preliminary examination.46 The
prescribed warnings explicitly manifest a concern with choice: "You
are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but
whatever you say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in
evidence against you upon your trial." 47 Since there were few police
at this time,48 the magistrate's examination functioned as an investi-
42 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 225 (1847) (first published 1678).
43 Id..
44 Rex v. Thompson, 1 Leach 291, 291, 168 Eng. Rep. 248, 248 (1783).
45 See id., I Leach at 293, 168 Eng. Rep. at 249.
46 See 11 & 12 Vict. c.42 (1848). For a description of the common law rule, see L.
LEVY, supra note 36, at 328; Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 59, 82 (1989).
47 11 & 12 Vict. c.42 (1848). Compare the Miranda warnings: "[you have] the right to
remain silent, any statement [you do] make[ ] may be used as evidence against (you],
[you have] the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
48 See Comment, The Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation: The Aftermath of Esco-
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gation. As we will discuss in more detail later, this suggests that the
function of Miranda v. Arizona in requiring similar warnings prior to
police interrogation was to modernize, rather than revolutionize,
the self-incrimination concept.49
Indeed, as police assumed investigative responsibilities, English
courts drew no distinction between police questioning and the mag-
istrate's examination. Statements taken outside the courtroom were
inadmissible in "every case where a man is not a free agent in meet-
ing an inquiry" because "[t]he mind in such a case would be likely to
be affected by the very influences which render the [in-court] state-
ments of accused persons inadmissible."' 50 The statement by a po-
lice officer, "I think it would be better if you made a statement and
told me exactly what happened" typically caused the English courts
to suppress a resulting confession.5 1 It is difficult to conclude that
this type of police questioning is normatively unfair or likely to elicit
an unreliable response.
Early United States Supreme Court cases followed the English
cases. In Brain v. United States,52 the first Supreme Court case to de-
cide the applicability of the fifth amendment to an out-of-court con-
fession, 53 the Court initially noted the English analogy between a
magistrate questioning a criminal defendant in court and police
bedo, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 337, 347-48 (1965); Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE LJ. 1000, 1040-42 (1964).
49 See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 14, at 44 (noting that Miranda was "hardly a thunderbolt
from the blue"); infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text. Miranda's detractors, in-
cluding former Attorney General Ed Meese, have argued that Miranda rejected hundreds
of years of steady, stable confessions law that manifested a reliability rationale. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL
INTERROGATION (Feb. 12, 1986). But this is simply inaccurate, as Benner has demon-
strated in more detail. See Benner, supra note 46, at 80-83 & 95-101.
50 See Regina v. Petit, 4 Cox C.C. 164, 165 (1850). Indeed, English judges in the
middle part of the nineteenth century stated vigorous disapproval of the "system of
police officers examining prisoners" even when the police warned the suspects that they
need not answer. See Regina v. Mick, F. & F. 822, 823, 176 Eng. Rep. 376, 376 (1863).
See also Regina v. Gavin, 15 Cox C.C. 656 (1885); Regina v. Baldry, 2 Den. 430, 169 Eng.
Rep. 568 (Crim. App. 1852); Regina v. Kerr, 8 C. & P. 176, 173 Eng. Rep. 449 (1837);
Regina v. Wild, I Moody C.C. 452, 168 Eng. Rep. 1341 (1835); Regina v. Thornton, 1
Moody C.C. 27, 168 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1824). This judicial attitude was, in the early
twentieth century, codified in a Royal Recommendation on Police Powers and Proce-
dures. See McCormick, supra note 34, at 258. The English reluctance to admit confes-
sions continued at least until the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of
1984. See Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 15-24.
51 See ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 15-36, at
1098-99 (42d ed. 1985).
52 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
53 The earliest confession case, Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), used federal evi-
dence law to decide admissibility.
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questioning outside of court.54 This analogy implies that any police
questioning was sufficient to deprive Bram of the choice protected
by the fifth amendment unless it were preceded by a warning that
Bram did not have to answer.
Although the Court concluded that this per se rule was incon-
sistent with its precedents, 55 it did find coercive Bram's relatively
benign interrogation. The detective stated that Brain's situation
was "rather an awkward one. I have had [another suspect] in this
office, and he made a statement that he saw you do the murder."
56
The Court concluded that there was no "possible implication that
[Bram's] reply to the detective could have been the result of a purely
voluntary mental action; that is to say . . . that it must necessarily
have been the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on
the mind."
57
A concern with choice (and the influence of English cases) can
be seen in the Court's framing of the issue: whether Bram's state-
ments were "made by one who, in law, could be considered a free
agent."' 58 This suggests that "[r]eliability concerns alone cannot
have been at the heart of [the self-incrimination] doctrine, for we
know now what they must surely have known then-rules may be
fashioned which, for the most part, assure truthfulness" of com-
pelled testimony. 59 And the Bram Court did not question the fair-
ness of the police tactics but, rather, "their resultant effect upon the
54 Bram, 168 U.S. at 556-57.
55 See id. at 558 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), and Sparfv. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895)).
56 Id. at 562. The only physically coercive aspect of Brain's interrogation was that the
officer "stripped the defendant, and examined his clothing." Id. at 538. But the Court
did not comment on whether this aspect made the interrogation more coercive. Compare
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (1945) (noting coerciveness of keeping suspect
naked for three hours and in a state of semi-dress for another seven hours); id. at 407
(prosecutor argued that Malinski was kept naked "to humiliate him.., let him sit in the
corner, let him think he was going to get a shellacking").
57 Bram, 168 U.S. at 562. The Court's "hope/fear" concern was that a suspect would
simultaneously hope to deflect guilt by responding and fear a negative inference from
silence. See id. But this hope/fear dilemma would seem to be present whenever a police
question seeks to uncover the facts of a crime, thus suggesting that a similar result might
obtain whenever interrogation causes a confession. See Benner, supra note 46, at 108-09
(noting but rejecting this reading of Brain). Miranda developed a similar rule several
decades later. See infra Part III.
58 Bram, 168 U.S. at 564.
59 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 1044-45 (making this observation
about the development of the Talmudic rule against self-incrimination) (footnotes omit-
ted). If reliability were the primary concern, confession law would require indicia of
reliability as a condition for admission. See Seidman, supra note 24, at 152. Bram men-
tioned reliability only twice and then only indirectly by quoting others. See Bram, 168
U.S. at 546 (quoting GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 140 (1760)); id. at 547 (quoting 2
W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 46 § 3 (Leach ed. 1787)).
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mind" of the suspect. 60 The Court also discussed more than two
dozen English and American state cases in which the bare sugges-
tion that it would be better for the accused to confess was held suffi-
cient to render a subsequent statement compelled.
6 1
Wigmore later condemned the Brain Court for its "sentimental-
ism, a false tenderness to guilty [defendants], and an unnecessary
deviation from principle"-the principle being the reliability justifi-
cation for the confessions rule.62 Wigmore did, however, acknowl-
edge that the reliability principle had been declining in importance
since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Wigmore's opin-
ion, the early 1800s saw a change in "the whole attitude of the
judges" that resulted in "'a general suspicion of all confessions, a
prejudice against them as such, and an inclination to repudiate them
upon the slightest pretext."'6 3 Wigmore saw these cases as "absurdi-
ties" that "disfigured the law of confessions," and he looked for ex-
planations in the structure of English society, the organization of
the judiciary, and the disadvantages posed to the accused by the
criminal procedure of the era.64
Wigmore's analysis is, of course, but one reading of the histori-
cal data. 65 The crucial question-whether the confession should be
attributed to the witness or to the interrogator-is ultimately ideo-
logical, and its answer will depend on the prevailing ideology. In-
deed, the very existence of the self-incrimination principle must
60 Brain, 168 U.S. at 548; Benner, supra note 46, at 107.
61 See Brain, 168 U.S. at 552-56 (English cases) & 558-61 (American cases).
62 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 865 at 225. For a statement of Wig-
more's reliability test, see id. at § 819. Bram is, to be sure, "fundamentally inconsistent
with the trustworthiness rationale." See Benner, supra note 46, at 109.
63 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, at § 820.
64 Id., § 865 at 221-25.
65 See Urick, The Right Against Compulsoy Self-Incrimination in Early American Law, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 107, 117 n.39 (1988) ("Wigmore misinterpreted history"
with respect to the English law of confessions). Wigmore also ignored Blackstone's
1769 comment that confessions "are the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony."
See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357. Wigmnore quite incorrectly wrote that con-
fessions in Blackstone's era "were thought of in general as 'the highest evidence of
guilt'; and there was no general sentiment against them." See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 12, § 819 (source of quoted material not given). Wigmore quotes Black-
stone's skeptical comments in a later footnote but cryptically dismisses the reference as
"merely the reproduction of a classical predecessor's language." See id § 866 and n.2.
Finally, Wigmore ignored state statutory limitations on police interrogation. See generally
McCormick, supra note 34, at 251-54 (discussing statutory limitations on police interro-
gation in selected states). One statutory limitation was the Kentucky Anti-"Sweating"
Act of 1912 that prohibited a person having lawful custody of any person charged with a
crime to "attempt to obtain information from the accused concerning his connection
with or knowledge of crime by plying him with questions," Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 422.110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986 & Supp. 1990).
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satisfy some essential ideological function. 66 Otherwise, the pres-
sure arising from the need to accurately determine guilt or inno-
cence 67 would have weakened or negated it.68
The modem descriptions of the clause underscore its choice-
based ideological function. Robert Gerstein argues that the clause
protects what, more than anything else, makes each of us unique:
"the inner-most recesses of conscience." 69 Richard Uviller notes
that "the self-destructive act is so grave that it is deemed invalid
unless undertaken with full consciousness of its dire consequences,
and in the untrammeled exercise of personal determination."7 0 Abe
Fortas wrote, "A man may be punished, even put to death by the
state; but... he should not be made to prostrate himself before its
66 See Ellis, Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth
Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 829, 851 (1970) (self-incrimination clause embodies a "basi-
cally non-rational" concept). While American commentators quarrel endlessly about
how (or if) the clause limits police interrogation, only a handful of commentators have
called for abolition of the clause. See Carman, A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional Privi-
lege from the Accused, 22 MINN. L. REV. 200, 204-05 (1938); Terry, Constitutional Provisions
Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE LJ. 127 (1906); Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum
Prodere, 5 HARV. L. Rev. 71, 87 (1891). The proposal of a 1970's law reform commission
in England to limit the scope of the right to pre-trial silence "failed after heated debate."
Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 40. See also Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great
Britain, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 81 (1979).
67 Many of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees can be explained as fur-
thering (or at least not impeding) the accurate determination of guilt and punishment-
for example, the sixth amendment requires a speedy, public and impartial trial; notice of
the charges; the right to confront witnesses; and the assistance of counsel. Only the
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the self-in-
crimination clause are directly inconsistent with accurate determinations of guilt.
Although the Supreme Court has recently reduced the scope of fourth amendment pro-
tection, Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257
(1984), the self-incrimination clause has escaped the recent surge of crime control senti-
ment relatively unscathed. Compare Wasserstrom, supra, with Baltimore Dept. of Social
Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900, 908-09 (1990) (suggesting that competing societal
interests may limit the self-incrimination clause's protection only in very narrowly-de-
fined categories).
68 See Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1063 (1986)(arguing that the self-incrimination clause cannot be justified on
consequentialist terms); Dripps, suprai note 14, at 711-18 (same). But cf Ellis, supra note
66, at 851-56 (1970) (concluding, that given our present knowledge, compelling defend-
ants to testify would likely produce only a small net increase in the number of convic-
tions); Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 29-31 (arguing that the self-incrimination clause may
produce a long-term net social benefit from building character that "strenuously avoids
self-destructive actions").
69 Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 Emics 87, 92 (1970). See also id. at 90
(arguing that individuals "ought to have absolute control over the making of such reve-
lations as these").
70 Uviller, supra note 16, at 1146. See also Westen & Mandell, supra note 16, at 522
(clause designed "to protect persons from having to choose between serving as instru-
ments of their own criminal condemnation or suffering alternative sanctions for refusing
to do so").
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majesty. Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that
cannot be exacted from free men by human authority. '71
Fortas also wrote, for the Supreme Court, that "the roots of the
privilege... tap the basic stream of religious and political principle
because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attorn-
ment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the
equality of the individual and the state."' 72 In a world in which the
state and the individual are equal, the state must respect a choice
not to testify.73 It also must not seek to create a preference to tes-
tify, for that determination would lie within individual autonomy.
We do not seek to justify, in normative terms, the existence of
the self-incrimination clause. The world described by Fortas in
which the individual and the state are truly equal may be morally
unacceptable because it sacrifices the good of the collective on the
altar of autonomy. Our point is more modest. Beginning with Hob-
bes, the descriptions of the self-incrimination principle have embod-
ied an ideology in which human autonomy and choice are
paramount values. Thus, we believe the clause owes its existence to
this choice ideology. Viewing the clause as an embodiment of
choice ideology has different ramifications than the alternative views
that stress the reliability of the confession or the morality of P's ac-
tions. We now wish to explore those ramifications.
II. COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION
What does it mean to be "compelled" to give self-incriminating
testimony? Is compulsion synonymous with lack of choice? Is it ap-
propriate to use the same definition for self-incrimination compul-
sion that philosophers use when identifying coercion that avoids
moral responsibility for compelled acts? These questions are the
concern of this section. One issue we will not address is whether
"coercion" and "compulsion" have precisely the same meaning.
The standard usage, which we accept, is that these terms are
interchangeable. 74
71 Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B. Ass'N J. 91,
100 (1954).
72 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
73 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.45 (1975) ("Freedom of choice is not
a stranger to the constitutional design of procedural protections for a defendant in a
criminal proceeding. For example, '[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
his own defense, or to refuse to do so.' ") (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225 (1971)).
74 Linguistic usage is somewhat different. While one would not say the sun coerced S
into wearing a hat, see Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"--Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 560, one could quite comfortably say that the sun compelled S to
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.The paradigmatic example of compelled testimony is forcing
the defendant to take the witness stand and answer questions under
the threat of contempt of court. Despite the language of the clause
that prohibits compelling someone "in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself," it does not appear that the framers intended
to limit the protection of the clause to this situation. So limited, the
clause would have been a "meaningless tautology" in 1792 because
the common law already prohibited criminal defendants from testi-
fying in their own trial.75 More significantly for our purposes, noth-
ing suggests that S's choice is constrained any less by pressure that
occurs outside the courtroom.
Virtually everyone has given up trying to limit the prohibition
of compelled self-incrimination to courtroom testimony.76 But it is
more difficult to identify and quantify pressure that occurs outside
the formal procedures of courtroom testimony. After all, there is no
legal penalty for failure to answer police questions. And, presuma-
bly, some guilty suspects will want to confess to police at least in
part because of a Raskolnikov-like desire to be punished.77
The lack of a workable test for compulsion in the police interro-
gation room has left the field clear for ideologies to operate as un-
seen, unspoken roadmaps of thought that produce necessary
answers to questions that may be empirically unanswerable. 78 For
example, Aristotle drew a distinction between external and internal
causation of conduct; conduct was compelled when "the principle of
action is external" and the actor "contributes nothing of his own." 79
But deciding whether the "principle of action" is external or inter-
nal is surely an ideological judgment when P interrogates S, involv-
ing, as it does, a determination of the unknowable-whether the will
wear a hat. Thus, perhaps "compel" requires less purpose on the part of the compellor
than does "coerce." Perhaps it requires no purpose at all; the sun, after all, lacks
purpose.
75 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1930). See also L. LEVY, supra note 36, at 409.
76 See Grano, supra note 12, at 867 (conceding that "pursuit of this argument, exhaus-
tively presented by others, would be unproductive"); id. at 927 (noting that "[Ilittle
would be gained at this point by rehearsing once again" these arguments).
77 See F. DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866). Dostoevsky wrote, in a letter
to his publisher, "that the legal punishment inflicted for a crime intimidates a criminal
infinitely less that lawmakers suppose, in part because the criminal himself morally de-
mands that punishment." Id. at xiii (Editor's Introduction to 1963 Washington Square
Press edition) (emphasis in original).
78 As Alan Wertheimer has observed, "while philosophers worry about what to say
about coercion claims, judges must decide what to do about them." A. WERTHEIMER,
COERCION 13 (1987).
79 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, § 1.
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of S or of P prevailed.8 0
A. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES DISTINGUISHED
Although Aristotle's external/internal distinction fails to pro-
vide an empirical solution to most coercion problems,8 1 it does re-
move one category of potential cases from consideration. If only
external action constitutes coercion, coercion cannot exist in the ab-
sence of an external constraint. Much of the confession literature
ignores this potential limitation and fails to distinguish between the
influence of internal and external forces. Some commentators thus
conclude that it is impossible to measure the pressure on suspects
and, from there, conclude that "either all statements are coerced or
none are."8 2 But an account of compulsion that attempts to mea-
sure the influence of external forces need not become impaled on
the horns of this dilemma. To be sure, other influences exist: the
suspect's moral or religious background, his current state of health,
his perception of his success or failure in life, his intelligence, and so
on. The difficulty is that any attempt to measure the coercive effect
of these internal influences is incoherent because the influences are
part of the human personality rather than forces that act on it.
For example, consider again S who "freely" confessed to a mur-
der because of God's threat, a hypothetical based on Colbrado v. Con-
nelly.8 3 Connelly approached a uniformed police officer on the
street and confessed to a murder despite the officer's diligent recita-
tion of the Miranda warnings and an additional warning that Con-
nelly "was under no obligation to say anything."8 4 Connelly stated
that he would talk to the officer "because his conscience had been
bothering him," and he "openly detailed" a story in which he killed
a young woman about a year earlier.8 5 A psychiatrist testified later
that Connelly had been following the "voice of God" and that God
80 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 292 ("The view that external causes render
action involuntary depends less on this protean spatial metaphor than on the signifi-
cance attributed to placing a certain cause under the internal or external rubric.").
81 Professor Wertheimer believes that an empirical solution may be unattainable. See
id at 288 (empirical theories of coercion "seem to either collapse into moralized theo-
ries or be unable to distinguish the coercion that bars the ascription of responsibility
from the coercion that does not").
82 Grano, supra note 34, at 685 n.101. See also Dripps, supra note 14, at 700 (arguing
that "[a]ny expectation that truly voluntary confessions are available on a systemic basis
depends either on unsupportable factual assumptions or on an interpretation of volun-
tariness that reduces that word to signifying no more than the absence of third degree
methods").
83 479 U.S. 157 (1986).




had given him the choice "either to confess to the killing or to com-
mit suicide." 8 6
The Colorado Supreme Court held Connelly's statement inad-
missible because he "was incapable of making an intelligent and free
decision with respect to his constitutional right of silence."87
Although he was not constrained by other humans, the state court
wrote, "One's capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be
overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by
external pressure."88 A more extreme version of this principle
holds that "[g]uilt and a desire to be punished, a desire to shift re-
sponsibility to others, and the need for love" are forces operating
outside a "free will and a rational intellect." 89
But the crucial question is whether protection from compulsion
entails a minimum "capacity for rational judgment" or any other
internal capacity. The United States Supreme Court rejected this
"positive liberty" 90 entailment when it overruled the Colorado
Supreme Court, noting that Connelly's claim could be sustained
"[o]nly if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the
right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when to-
tally rational and properly motivated." 91 The Court's rejection of
this reading of the clause is consistent with Aristotle's distinction
between external and internal causation of conduct.
Many have criticized the Court's holding in Connelly.92 Justice
Brennan stated in his Connelly dissent that the Court had "upheld
the admission of a confession that does not reflect the exercise of
free will." 93 But to argue that Connelly's free will was contravened
assumes that internal human forces somehow impair, rather than
are a part of, the human personality. For example, Donald Dripps
argues that one should not be held responsible for confessions re-
sulting "from personality traits" that are "outside the broad ambit
of ordinary experience." 94 This argument depends on discriminat-
86 Id. at 161.
87 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985)).
88 Id. at 728.
89 See Dripps, supra note 14, at 705.
90 The "positive" liberty concept is borrowed from Isaiah Berlin. See I. BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969).
91 479 U.S. at 166; Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1049 (noting that the "policies of the
fifth amendment privilege do not demand rationality, intelligence, or knowledge, but
only a voluntary choice not to remain silent").
92 See, e.g., Benner, supra note 46, at 127 (arguing that Connelly "repudiates the con-
cept of 'free will' as an independent element of voluntariness").
93 479 U.S. at 178 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Dripps, supra note 14, at 704.
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ing between "normal" and "abnormal" internal forces. Presumably
the latter, but not the former, poison free choice.
The question is put in perspective if one assumes Connelly
wrote a letter to the police containing the same details that he orally
told the officer.95 Should the self-incrimination clause bar introduc-
tion of the letter? If the answer is no, it supports Aristotle's "exter-
nal action" view of compulsion and thus the result the Court
reached in Connelly. Connelly's volunteered confession cannot be
distinguished from the hypothetical letter because the officer did
nothing to encourage him to confess. 96 If the self-incrimination
clause bars admission of the letter, the clause must forbid internal
compulsion-at least when the internal forces are "abnormal."
There are a number of practical and theoretical problems in
separating "normal" internal forces from abnormal forces, not the
least of which is defining what is normal. For example, how does
one differentiate between the voice of conscience and the voice of
God? But the most significant problem is the assumption itself.
Many external forces become internalized as part of our conscience,
ranging from parents to religion to Girl/Boy Scouts to school to
peer groups. It is not clear why choice should be rendered less free
by internal forces that are labelled abnormal. 97 An internal force is
an internal force whether it is shared by most of us or only a few.
Indeed, what does it mean to be "compelled" by one's own person-
ality? As Alan Wertheimer has cogently observed, "Those who ar-
gue.., that socialization limits freedom would do well to remember
that not everything about a person or his condition can be said to
limit his freedom without devouring the self who is capable of being
constrained and whose freedom is to be valued."98 If a conscience-
motivated confession is viewed as compelled, little is left of the self
95 We thank Yale Kamisar for the hypothetical. Telephone conversation with
Kamisar (June 27, 1990).
96 There was a second confession which poses a somewhat more complex problem
because it followed interrogation. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 172-75 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the first confession was
admissible, because volunteered, but the second was inadmissible, because Connelly was
legally incompetent and thus incapable of waiving his Miranda rights). See also Benner,
supra note 46, at 137; Dix, supra note 16, at 276-82; Dripps, supra note 14, at 709. For
our resolution of the "second confession" issue, see infra note 171.
97 Compare A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 290 (arguing that a psychological ac-
count of coercion is not the only "interesting explanation" of "the way coercion under-
mines voluntariness") with Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 42, 56-59 (1968) (surveying social and psychological pressures to speak created
by arrest and detention).
98 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 261 (emphasis in original).
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of the confessor. 9 9
Aristotle's observation that compulsion entails an "external
principle of action" avoids having the individual self devoured by
disregarding internal forces and accepting human conduct at face
value-absent an external principle of action, every choice must be
that of the individual. While this might not be so in fact, 10 0 Aristotle
presumed it, and some presumption is inevitable. 0 1 This "external
principle of action" cannot differentiate between conscience and
mental illness-they are all internal forces unique to the individual
and could never constitute coercion. Connelly's confession was,
under this conception of freedom, freely given if one assumes the
voice of God was an internal force.10 2 In cases in which an external
force acts on S, the question becomes, in Aristotle's words, whether
"the actor contributes nothing of his own" to the subsequent con-
fession,' 03 and we now turn to that question.
B. MEASURING THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL FORCES
Aristotle's notion that coercion exists only when the actor "con-
tributes nothing of his own" cannot be taken literally without rein-
stituting what we termed Aristotle's paradox-at least when defining
compelled testimony. When P physically shoves S into the path of a
bullet, everyone agrees that this act of physical or "occurrent" 104
coercion substitutes P's will for S's. Because this definition of coer-
cion is not controversial, it is rarely discussed. 10 5 But confessions
99 Cf Connelly, 479 U.S. at 172 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (comparing Connelly's initial statements with those of Lady Macbeth
during her guilt-ridden nightmare; see W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, scene 1, lines
41 & 47); Dix, supra note 16, at 280 (suggesting that "at some point, the reasonable
effectiveness of the law reaches its limits, and suspects must assume some responsibility
for protecting their own interests"). But see Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The
Implemnentation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L. J. 1, 29 (1970) (suggesting that confessions moti-
vated by guilty conscience might not be valid waivers of Miranda rights).
100 Leiken, for example, argues that attributing choice to persons who know their
rights "is to rely on a fiction that is questionable in light of the actual decision-making
process." See Leiken, supra note 99, at 29.
101 Cf A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 292 ("Internality, as it were, is not a loca-
tional feature of a motivation. It is part of its description.") (emphasis in original).
102 To be sure, mental illness could render a confession unreliable and thus inadmis-
sible under a due process principle that forbids a conviction based on false evidence. Cf
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding that prosecutor's knowing use of per-
jured evidence requires reversal of the conviction); Mooney v. Hollohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) (same).
103 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, § 1.
104 See Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in NoMos XIV COERCION, supra note 8, at 17.
105 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 10 (describing physical coercion as a non-
standard case of coercion); Bayles, supra note 104, at 17 (concluding that non-physical
coercion occurs more frequently).
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are not susceptible to physical compulsion; S's volition will always
be involved in some manner. Thus, Aristotle's paradox leads to the
bizarre result that all testimony is noncompelled. Because this re-
sult makes the self-incrimination clause meaningless, the framers
must have contemplated a category of volitional-but-compelled
testimony.
One way to isolate compelled volitional conduct is to draw a
distinction between a free choice and a constrained choice; the latter
would constitute compulsion.' 0 6 It is easy to conclude that some
choices are constrained-for example, the choice between the rack
and confessing or the choice between giving over the bank's money
and being shot. But by what standard would one determine whether
S's choice was constrained in close cases? 10 7 Is S's choice con-
strained when she has no attractive alternative? No meaningful al-
ternative? No plausible alternative? When P tells S that X saw her
commit a murder, does this constrain S's choice? If the answer is
yes-because P has made S's choice more difficult-it raises the pos-
sibility that every effort to encourage S to confess constrains S's
choice. If the answer is no-because S had an alternative-the para-
dox is reinstituted (S always has an alternative to confessing).
Drawing on Kant's theory of reason, it is possible that S's
choice is constrained any time she chooses inconsistently with her
internal law of reason.' 0 8 Because an internal law of reason presum-
ably would not produce a false statement,10 9 one could conclude
that all false confessions are compelled. But the converse-all truth-
ful confessions are noncompelled-cannot be true. The shadow of
the rack is an important part of the clause's history 1 0 whether or
not it explains everything about the self-incrimination principle.
106 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 10.
107 Stephen Markman posits the proper standard as "actual compulsion," but fails to
define it. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsider-
ing Miranda", 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 947-48 (1987). If he means to suggest that "actual
compulsion" is a self-defining concept in the context of non-physical coercion, we
strongly disagree. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
108 Robert Nozick characterizes Kant's "tradition" as holding "that we are free when
our acts are done in accordance with reason, when a law of reason determines them." R.
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION 353 (1981). See, e.g., I. KANT, CRrrIQUE OF PURE
REASON 633 (N. Smith trans. 1965); I. KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS
§ 53 (P. Carus trans. 1985). Professor Michael Moore has argued, in a different context,
that "compulsion involves interference with practical reasoning." Moore, Causation and
the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1129 (1985) (discussing compulsion as part of com-
mon law defense of duress).
109 See R. NOZICK, supra note 108, at 355.
110 See L. LEVY, supra note 36, at 34-35; WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 818
at 131 (noting use of torture until mid-1600s to produce confessions that were "em-
ployed evidentially without scruple").
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One can hardly conclude that a confession given after hours or days
of intense pain, and the promise of more, is freely given because
true.
Perhaps, then, S's choice has been constrained when "associ-
ated with an attraction too strong to resist."11 If the pressure to
confess reaches this "irresistible" level, it is, by definition, impossi-
ble for S to do otherwise than confess. As Wigmore put it in the
early part of this century, "[U]nder the violent pain of the rack," a
suspect would "think[ ] of nothing but the present relief from agony
which his confession will gain him."' 112 In this situation, S would
confess whether or not the confession were true. The "irresistible"
concept of coercion is thus consistent with Kant's law of reason
(false confessions are compelled) without also implying that all
truthful confessions are freely given. Under Wigmore's analysis, the
rack-induced confession is compelled whether or not it is true be-
cause the rack creates irresistible pressure."
13
To determine what forces are irresistible requires either a win-
dow into the particular mental process of S or a presumption about
how humans react to various forces." 4 How else could one ever
know whether it was impossible for S to do otherwise? Wigmore
presumed that certain interrogation methods would likely produce
false confessions-unkept promises of pardon and threats of pain
and physical deprivation' 15-and, from there, he presumed that any
confession induced by these methods was involuntary." 6 The co-
rollary presumption is that S's response to all other interrogation
methods is a free will response motivated by "internal mental
forces-such as remorse, the psychic pressure of guilt, or the belief,
however unwise, that one should try to provide an explanation."
' "17
The narrowness of Wigmore's reliability test' 18, however, is in-
consistent with the historic application of the self-incrimination
111 See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 824 at 145. See also H. FRANKFURT,
supra note 18, at 49.
112 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 833 at 159.
113 See id. (noting that this question "was apparently neverjudicially decided" but that
the inadmissibility of a rack-induced confession "is of course unquestioned to-day").
114 Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 535 (1966) (White, J, dissenting) (objecting
to the majority's conclusion that "custodial questioning was so coercive and accused
persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very first question
following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the prod-
uct of an overborne will").
115 See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, at §§ 833-34.
116 Id. § 865 at 225.
117 Grano, supra note 12 at 898 (footnote omitted).
118 See id. at 919 ("That few defendants will succeed in suppressing confessions under
these limitations cannot be a legitimate basis for complaint").
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clause to the courtroom. One certainty about the self-incrimination
clause is that it permits S to refuse to testify if faced with a choice of
answering or the penalty of contempt of court. Yet S's incriminat-
ing testimony made under threat of contempt is not likely to be
false. The threat of contempt hardly seems the kind of threat that
would make S abandon her will and confess falsely."19
Indeed, if the threat of contempt typically produced false testi-
mony, it would not be very useful to prosecutors. While Wigmore's
abstract conception of compulsion is conceptually unflawed-S is
compelled when it is impossible for S to do otherwise' 2 0-the mech-
anism Wigmore used to implement this conception seems too nar-
row to explain even the historic function of the self-incrimination
clause. If this assessment is accurate, one would expect courts to
reject the "reliability" test for coercion. The courts began to do this
in the 1930s and 1940s as they moved to embrace a normative test.
C. WRONGFUL EXTERNAL FORCES
Not long after Wigmore published his treatise, courts began to
shift the focus from the suspect's will to the police conduct.' 2 ' By
the mid-1940's, "disciplining of state law enforcement officers be-
came a principal purpose of the . . .confessions rule."' 12 2 The ra-
tionale for this change was never clearly expressed. One
explanation is that some police conduct should be prohibited simply
119 See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 443 (1987). To be
fair to Wigmore, he argued that the rule prohibiting admission of involuntary confes-
sions was independent of the fifth amendment self-incrimination bar against compelled
courtroom testimony. 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, at § 2266. The rule
prohibiting admission of involuntary confessions, he argued, was a evidentiary rule; the
fifth amendment self-incrimination bar against compelled courtroom testimony, a con-
stitutional privilege. Id. Today, however, the two doctrines have merged. The fifth
amendment prohibits compelled self-incriminating testimony; it would necessarily also
bar admission of involuntary self-incriminating statements. Whatever formal distinc-
tions might exist in raising these claims, see id., the substance of each claim is that the
speaker was forced against his will to give incriminating testimony. Whether one calls
the testimony "compelled" or "involuntary" seems irrelevant. Thus, to argue, as Wig-
more does, that some involuntary confessions would not be compelled and vice-versa,
id., seems quite bizarre today.
120 See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, at § 824. Harry Frankfurt articulates
essentially the same standard: S acts unfreely only when S's "inclination to avoid the
undesirable consequence he faces is irresistible; it is impossible for him to bring himself
to accept that consequence." H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 49.
121 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the
Court's "initial emphasis on reliability" which was later "supplemented by concern over
the legality and fairness of the police practices in an accusatorial system of law
enforcement.").




because it is normatively unfair and thus denies suspects the fairness
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
123
Under this normative approach, the famous "Christian burial
speech"'124 would be equally wrongful when directed to an atheist as
when directed, as it was, to a minister. But the link between norma-
tively unfair police conduct and coercion as defined by Aristotle is
far from self-evident.
Commentators use "normative" in different ways to describe
coercion accounts. For example, Joseph Grano argues that the co-
ercion inquiry requires a "normative judgment about impairment of
mental freedom."' 125 Used in this manner, "normative" entails a de-
cision about how much impairment of mental freedom constitutes
coercion; virtually all accounts of coercion, from Wigmore's to Mi-
randa's, would qualify as normative in this sense. Alan Wertheimer
uses "normative" in two ways, both of which are distinct from
Grano's usage. First, Wertheimer contrasts "normative" and "em-
pirical" accounts of coercion. 126 Empirical accounts (like Wig-
more's) seek to determine as an empirical fact whether S's will was
overborne. Normative accounts, by contrast, have at their core a
judgment that certain immoral conduct by P will always render S's
response coerced.
But if protecting the will of the individual is not the goal, if the
goal is to deter certain police methods, why identify the goal as
prohibiting "compulsion"? Once the link between police conduct
and the subject's will becomes irrelevant, one does not need to
know whether S or P was the source of S's conduct. Courts could
simply rely on the due process clause to regulate the state's treat-
ment of suspects.
Wertheimer's second use of "normative" is more narrow. As-
suming that a particular level of pressure causes S to act involunta-
rily (as an empirical fact), a link may exist between the wrongfulness
of P's conduct and the empirical fact of S's involuntariness. 27 Be-
cause our paper is committed to assessing when P overbears S's will,
123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Y. KAMiSAR, supra note 14, at 21 (suggesting
"that were the appropriate case to arise, one with a sufficient degree of offensive or
deliberate and systematic police misconduct, the Supreme Court would exclude the con-
fession as a matter of due process even though neither the particular defendant nor
anybody else were at all likely to confess falsely under the circumstances").
124 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977).
125 Grano, supra note 12 at 866.
126 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 6-10.
127 Id. at 288-90. Wertheimer uses "coercion" to signify a legal conclusion that S is
entitled to deny responsibility for her acts and "involuntariness" to mean an empirical
determination that S's will was overborne. We use both terms in the empirical sense.
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rather than whether the police acted in accord with general stan-
dards of due process, normative accounts justify separate discussion
only in Wertheimer's second sense of the term. The immorality of
P's conduct is relevant to the empirical question only if immoral
techniques add to the pressure on S because of their immorality.
Does S somehow find an immoral constraint more difficult to resist
than a moral constraint? It is important to be clear about this point.
The rack is both immoral and irresistible. Wigmore believed the
rack was coercive because it was irresistible, not because it was im-
moral. Threatening to bring in S's ailing wife for questioning when
there are no grounds to detain her is immoral; it may or may not be
irresistible. 128 If P's threat is irresistible because it is immoral, it
must be because its immorality somehow affects S's will to resist.
The argument goes as follows: if P's constraint is morally right,
then S's decision to accede would be noncompelled because she
would concur in the morality of P's constraint (even though she
does not want to be constrained).129 But since S expects moral
treatment, if P's constraint is wrongful, it goes "against [S]'s will
through to [S]'s action."' 30 In the confession context, this account
holds that the will of the individual is impermissibly constrained if
the state applies pressure it has no right to apply.
So defined, the normative standard explains the courtroom ap-
plication of the self-incrimination clause. The phrasing of the clause
and its history reveals that the state is not permitted to call the de-
fendant to the witness stand. Because this violates the normative
standard contained in the fifth amendment itself, it is easy to say that
it compels the resulting testimony-the state places a constraint on
the defendant it has no right to place.1'1 But neither the explicit
language of the amendment nor its history implies a standard by
which to judge whether police techniques used to elicit information
128 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (holding such threats were coercive
under the facts of that case).
129 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 301.
130 See id. at 302.
131 Indeed, as noted earlier, it is difficult to make a non-normative finding of compul-
sion when S chooses to testify in court rather than endure a penalty for contempt. This
testimony does not seem unreliable when measured by Wigmore's "likelihood of falsity"
test. Moreover, it seems unlikely to meet any test that has, at its core, the requirement
that compulsion render impossible S doing otherwise. S could have refused to testify
and accepted the penalty. While this is not a choice S wanted to have, most people
would consider it possible to defy the threat of contempt. See, e.g., H. FRANKFURT, supra
note 18, at 48-49. Thus, the only satisfactory explanation of compulsion in its historic,
courtroom context may be the normative explanation. As this paper is about police




from an arrestee are improper.1 32 Although a few easy cases exist
(such as threatening to question S's ailing wife), the possibility of
developing a standard that does more than reflect an ad hoc judg-
ment seems quite remote.1 33
Indeed, the difficulty in formulating standards is a feature of all
normative accounts of coercion, not just those that seek to explain
the self-incrimination clause.134 But it is particularly difficult to
draw a normative line beyond which police interrogation becomes
wrongful because police conduct that attempts to solve a crime is
morally worthy.1 35 Thus, the normative standard for wrongful pres-
sure in the interrogation context ranges from "practices which are
repellent to civilized standards of decency" to practices "which,
under the circumstances, are thought to apply a degree of pressure
to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a ra-
tional choice."1 36 The wide range of potential standards is not the
only problem here; since the narrow normative account of coercion
presupposes that the wrongfulness of P's conduct somehow makes it
more coercive, what are we to do when S is unaware that P is acting
wrongfully-for example, if P lies about X stating that she saw S kill
the victim?
Another problem with the narrow normative account is that it
does not seem plausible. Why should the immorality of P's conduct
make it more difficult to resist? If P had probable cause to bring in
132 See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 55 (noting that the language of the clause "re-
flects no clear judgment about informal pressures to speak").
133 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 869-70 (criticizing the pre-Miranda voluntari-
ness test because "conscientious trial judges ... were virtually invited to give weight to
their subjective preferences"). Professor Uviller has argued that judges decide confes-
sion cases by applying "community norms of acceptable police conduct in the acquisi-
tion of evidence." Letter from Richard Uviller to authors (June 28, 1990) (on file with
editors ofJ..CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY). While this is clearly right, it remains true that
each case entails an ad hocjudgment. For example, to what extent is it fair for the police
to "take advantage of the ignorance or vulnerability of particular criminal suspects"? See
Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 CRIM. L. REV. 303, 308 (1987)
(arguing that it is fair in all cases).
134 Bernard Gert, for example argues that coercion entails the presence of "unreason-
able incentives." Gert, supra note 8, at 32. "An incentive is unreasonable if it would be
unreasonable to expect any rational man in that situation not to act on it." Id. at 34.
The only incentive that is always unreasonable, in Gert's view, is avoiding evil "for all
rational men must seek to avoid any evil-unless they have a reason." Id. But "not all
consequences that involve the avoiding of an evil will be unreasonable incentives. The
evils must be significant; usually only death, severe and prolonged pain, serious disabil-
ity, and extensive loss of freedom will be unreasonable incentives." Id. at 34-35. The
lack of practical standards here is quite apparent.
135 Grano, supra note 12, at 902.
136 Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detentions, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 62, 73 (1966).
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S's ailing wife for questioning, the threat would presumably be mor-
ally justified and thus non-coercive under the narrow normative test.
But would S not find that threat equally difficult to resist?
Moreover, normative tests have a tendency to collapse into tau-
tology. Note, for example, what Alan Wertheimer has to say about
his own normative account of coercion: "We typically say that B
should not be held responsible because B has been coerced, and yet,
on my account, we can determine that B has been coerced only
when we have, in effect, already determined that B should not be
held responsible." 13 7
In sum, the normative account potentially provides more ex-
pansive protection against police pressure than Wigmore's empiri-
cal account based on a reliability justification. The cost, however, is
a lack of standards by which to judge coercion. This lack of stan-
dards explains the disparate approaches to confession law that pre-
ceded the Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 38 But all
accounts considered to this point fail to describe Miranda because
the Court held there that any custodial police questioning in the
absence of warnings constitutes compulsion. 3 9 It is difficult to con-
dude that a single police question produces an unreliable confes-
sion or is morally wrongful when the police have probable cause to
suspect a person of a crime. We must look elsewhere for an ideol-
ogy that explains Miranda.
D. RECONCILING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES: HARRY
FRANKFURT'S SECOND-ORDER VOLITION ACCOUNT
If the normative accounts are an unsatisfying alternative to
Wigmore's empirical account of coercion, what is left? Perhaps
courts were too quick to reject Wigmore in favor of normative ac-
counts. Perhaps the problem with Wigmore was not the empirical
causation premise on which he relied but the narrow mechanism by
which he sought to infer external causation of confessions.
137 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 309. Wertheimer concludes that while his test is
tautological, an objection on that ground is "unimportantly correct" because it "rests, to
a considerable extent, on a false hope that precise conceptual analysis and careful empir-
ical investigation will resolve important moral issues that ostensibly turn on coercion
claims." Id While we agree that many theories of coercion contain hidden normative
premises, we do not agree that coercion can be satisfactorily identified only by a norma-
tive analysis.
138 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "While the voluntariness rubric was repeated in many in-
stances, the Court never pinned it down to a single meaning but on the contrary infused
it with a number of different values." Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting)(citations
omitted).
139 Id at 458.
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Wigmore concluded that coercion occurred only when an exter-
nal force overbears S's will to the extent that it is likely S confessed
falsely. In these cases, it is fair to say that S's will is not manifested
in the outcome; if she would confess falsely, her will has been thor-
oughly subjugated. But perhaps P can displace S's will-and thus
cause S's confession--even when S's will is somehow manifested in
the outcome.
This brings us to the crucial difficulty that has caused many
commentators to reject empirical accounts of fifth amendment coer-
cion. How can S be said to act against his will if his will is mani-
fested in the outcome? That is, ifS decides to confess because some
part of him wants to confess, why is that act of will not always a free
choice? One explanation is Harry Frankfurt's idea that humans have
two kinds of will. 140 S has a first-order desire that causes him to act
and a second-order volition that represents what he wants his first-
order desire to be. These wills can conflict; S may want his volition
to be different from the desire that actually motivates him to act.
14 1
In this situation, S acts based on his first-order desire, but "the de-
sire that moves him" causes him to act "against the will he
wants." 142 Thus, S acts according to his will (first-order desire), but
it is not the will he wants to have (second-order volition). Frankfurt
concludes that S acts unfreely in this situation.
Frankfurt's explanation does not mean that humans have a first-
order desire and then a second-order desire that is different only in
that it is more powerful in some strictly hierarchical sense and then
a third-order desire and so on. Rather, a second-order volition is
different generically from a first-order desire. Second-order volition
represents a point at which a person "identifies himself decisively with
one of his first-order desires."' 43 Second-order volition is more
than a transient wish; it is a relatively permanent part of the individ-
ual's personality. It is, therefore, human "will" in the sense that
term is typically used.144
To take one of Frankfurt's examples, an addict has a first-order
140 H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 47-57. For a similar account of autonomy, see
Dworkin, Acting Freely, Nous (November 1970).
141 H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 48 (identifying this as a category of unfree acts).
142 Id
143 Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). But see Watson, Free Agency, in MORAL REsPONSIBIL-
rr 94 (J. Fischer ed. 1986) (criticizing this aspect of Frankfurt's theory).
144 As such, second-order volition appears similar to Kant's internal law of reason,
supra note 108, and to David Hume's view that we are not free when our conduct is
caused by external forces that act independently of our will and preferences rather than




desire to take drugs and then a second-order volition that either
identifies with that first-order desire or rejects it because he does
not want that desire to be his will. The addict's second-order voli-
tion does not change from day to day as his need for the drug waxes
and wanes. It remains what he wants his will to be, regardless of
what his first-order desire might be at any given moment. If the
second-order volition is contrary to this first-order desire, but the
addict acts according to the first order desire anyway (takes the
drug), then Frankfurt contends that this act is unfree.
This is, we think, a broader view of what it means to act against
one's will than that which Wigmore held. It may reflect nothing
more than a late twentieth century conception of the power of exter-
nal forces in displacing human will. But it is particularly appropriate
as a measure of coercion in the context of police interrogation.
Wigmore's idea that coercion must exclude S's will may be appro-
priate when considering the philosophical question of whether S is
to be relieved of moral responsiblity for her conduct. 145 But we
read the self-incrimination clause to have an altogether different
purpose: to protect the individual's choice to confess guilt or remain
silent. 146 This means that S must be free to not answer. If S is un-
free in this regard, it does not matter that his first-order desire may
be manifested in the outcome; his choice was denied-he did not
want that desire to be his will-and choice is the heart of the self-
incrimination clause. 1
47
We thus conclude that Frankfurt's category of unfree acts
should be taken to define the category of compelled testimony. So
construed, the self-incrimination clause protects S's second-order
volition, and the state is forbidden from doing anything that causes
S to make a statement when her second-order volition is to want her
will to be not to want to answer questions that might incriminate
her. The potential conflict between second-order volition and first-
order desire explains why S can legitimately believe that she was
compelled to confess even when she knew she was not required to
145 See, e.g., H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 27. To be sure, Frankfurt rejects a stricter
definition of coercion even when determining whether S is morally responsible for her
acts. He concludes that S is relieved of moral responsiblity whenever she acts unfreely.
Id. at 48.
146 See supra Part I.
147 See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 (1961) (stating that confessions, to
be admissible, must be the product of the individual's "own free choice"); Rosenberg &
Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 1043-44 (noting that "[i]nability to choose freely whether




do so . 148 It justifies what is an intuitive distinction between "coer-
cion" and "persuasion"1 4 9-- the latter implies that S had no con-
trary second-order volition and was convinced by P to act on a first-
order desire; the former implies that S acted on a first-order desire
that was not her second-order volition.
One answer to Aristotle's paradox, then, is that one can act voli-
tionally and yet unfreely. All volitional choices are free in the sense
that they represent S's first-order desire, but to act on a first-order
desire does not mean that one has acted freely. Whether one acts
freely cannot be known until the relationship between first-order de-
sire and second-order volition is understood. This explanation not
only avoids Aristotle's paradox but also seems intuitively correct. It
is part of the human condition sometimes to do something that one
immediately regrets. Without some division of volition, however,
this, too, seems paradoxical. Why would one do something and
then immediately regret it? One solution to this paradox is that
while I wanted to do X, I did not want my will to be to want to do X.
So when I did X against my second-order volition, I immediately
regretted it. Perhaps I regretted X while I was doing it. 150 But I was
unfree with respect to doing X and thus had no choice.
This second-order volition account provides a satisfactory theo-
retical construct in which to locate compelled volitional acts, and it
avoids the normative question of what interrogation constraints are
permissible. But it cannot avoid the difficult question of whether
particular conduct is against S's second-order volition. Thus, the
second-order volition solution is no better at providing practical
guidance than any of the other solutions that seek to uncover the
will of the suspect. External observers have no measure of the inter-
nal human will. 15 ' The only reliable indication of the actor's will is
148 See Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,
77 YALE LJ. 300 (1967) (summarizing experience of faculty and students at Yale who
were interviewed by the FBI about their draft resistance activities after being told by the
law faculty that they were legally entitled to say nothing).
149 See Gert, supra note 8, at 43-45 (distinguishing coercion from persuasion); John-
son, supra note 133, at 303 (arguing that compulsion is not same as encouragement);
Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 146 (arguing that Kamisar "strains" the term "compul-
sion" when he equates it with "persuade"). Cf A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 293
(arguing that manipulation is more likely to produce involuntary conduct than persua-
sion because the latter (but not the former) is an external force that has become "thor-
oughly internalized").
150 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at § 1 (concluding that "[t]hose who act under com-
pulsion and involuntarily do so with pain").
151 See D. Hume, supra note 144, at § 8 (Part I) ("internal principles and motives may




the conduct in which she engages, but that indication is subject to
the confounding influence of external forces.
Consider S's confession made after P told her that X had seen
her kill the victim and that the prosecutor might be inclined to leni-
ency if she confessed. S did not choose to confess until P made
these statements, suggesting that her second-order volition is incon-
sistent with wanting to answer P's questions. Moreover, by raising
the cost of not confessing (if S believes P, S believes there is power-
ful evidence against her), and decreasing the cost of confessing (the
promise of possible leniency), it is plausible that P has caused S to
have a first-order desire to confess and to act on this desire that
conflicts with her second-order volition.
But this analysis assumes that S has a continuing second-order
volition that is inconsistent with confessing. Part of this assumption
is that the sum total of P's influence is to cause S to have a first-
order desire to confess. Perhaps P also causes S to change her sec-
ond-order volition. 152 If that is true, S has not been coerced. 153 An-
other part of our assumption is that S began the interrogation with a
second-order volition not to be moved by P's actions. While this is a
plausible presumption under the facts of the hypothetical, it remains
a presumption. 154 And, as Professor Dripps has noted, if one
presumes that all suspects want to not answer questions, any police-
induced confessions must be compelled. 155 Although Dripps offers
this observation as evidence of why one should not make such a pre-
sumption, his conclusion is open to question.
Consider an interrogation in which P says nothing about the
evidence against S and makes no mention of leniency; instead, P
engages in questioning S about her whereabouts, and S confesses
two hours into the interrogation. Again, S's failure to confess ear-
lier suggests that she wanted her will to be not to want to answer P's
questions. And the interrogation is a powerful influence on the
152 Even though a second-order volition is a relatively permanent part of the human
personality, it can, of course, change. An addict, for example, might change his second-
order volition toward taking the drug after a particularly bad experience. Several readers
pressed us on this point, but Harry Frankfurt made the most persuasive case. Letter
from Harry Frankfurt to authors (March 6, 1991) (on file with editors of J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY).
153 Of course, one might prefer a system in which P is not permitted to cause S to
change her second-order volition. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
154 Grano makes the same presumption for his "reasonable perison" against whom
coercion is measured. See Grano, supra note 12 at 905-06.
155 See Dripps, supra note 14, at 710 ("[W]hat 'person of ordinary firmness' 'strongly
preferring not to confess' would do so unless he found the 'interrogation pressures
overbearing'?). See also Y. KAMISAR, supra note 14, at 159-60.
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mind of S that is proximate in time and place to the confession. 156
Because human instinct is to avoid serious harm to self,157 and be-
cause P has physical control over S, it seems fair to conclude that S's
confession is against her second-order volition.
The situation is altogether different, of course, if S approached
the police and volunteered a statement. In that situation, no exter-
nal forces are acting on S, and her conduct must manifest her sec-
ond-order volition. 158 This, then, brings us to the hard case posed
by Justice White in his Miranda dissent: S is under arrest and con-
fesses after P first asks, "Do you have anything to say?"' 59 What
kind of presumption concerning S's second-order volition should
we make in this situation? If the answer is that we should presume
that she wanted her will to be to want to answer P's question, what if
the police asked ten questions first? Fifty? Five hundred?
It is clear that the second-order volition account of coercion of-
fers no window into the actual will of a suspect. What it does offer,




We noted earlier three rationales that could support a prohibi-
tion of compelled self-incrimination. Wigmore's view that compul-
sion entails P displacing (virtually) all of S's will led to a reliability
test for compulsion, a narrow view of fifth amendment coercion in-
consistent with its historic courtroom application. The concern with
the fairness of police techniques produced normative tests for ascer-
taining coercion, tests that often focus entirely on P's conduct rather
than S's will and, in any event, offer few standards beyond the sub-
jective impression of an observer. The choice rationale, by contrast,
privileges S's second-order volition not to want her will to be to
156 See Dripps, supra note 14, at 710 (noting "that police manipulation" is always the
"but for" cause of confessions that are not "spontaneously rendered").
157 Even Fred Inbau, a foe of Miranda-type restrictions, concedes this much. See In-
bau, Police Interrogation: A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 16,
17 (1961) (noting that "human beings ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous
confessions. They must first be questioned regarding the offense.").
158 This is, in essence, what the Court held in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986),
discussed supra notes 83-102.
159 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 533 (White, J. dissenting).
160 In this paper, we discuss only application of the second-order volition account to
police interrogation; thus, we express no opinion about other applications-for exam-
ple, the plea bargaining cases. See Dripps, supra note **, at 347 (discussing choice protec-
tion and plea bargaining).
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want to answer questions that might harm her. This ideology pro-
duced Miranda.
Miranda was no revolution in self-incrimination theory. Justice
Frankfurter had developed an "overbear the will" test a few years
prior to Miranda.'61 In explaining this test, he wrote that, "The line
of distinction is that at which the governing self-direction is lost and
compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or
helps to propel the confession."' 162 Frankfurter's focus on the loss
of "governing self-direction" by means of police interrogation is
consistent with a definition of compulsion as causing S to act in a
way that is contrary to her second-order volition. Thus, Frank-
furter's "overbear the will" test, while not successful as a practical
solution to the compulsion problem,' 63 paved the way for the Mi-
randa solution.
What does a court do when faced with real cases that must be
decided and with a definition of compulsion that depends on the
unknowable-the will (or second-order volition) of the suspect?
The answer is that courts create presumptions about the unknow-
able. One way to read Miranda is that the Court created the pre-
sumption that S's second-order volition, when faced with police
interrogation, is a continuing volition to want her will to be not to
want to answer questions that might incriminate her. But the
Court's presumption is rebuttable; if S understands that she need
not answer questions and the consequences of answering-informa-
tion provided by the required warnings' 64-one could then presume
that ifS answers, she wanted (or now wants) her will to be to want to
answer.1
65
161 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
162 Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
163 In Frankfurter's most ambitious attempt to define his "overbear the will" test, his
opinion for the Court attracted only Justice Stewart's vote. See id. at 568. Four members
of the Court concurred by noting that the case was simpler than Frankfurter implied. See
id at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Black, J.); id. at 640-41
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result) (joined by Warren, CJ., & Black, J.). Joseph
Grano has tried to improve Frankfurter's test by making it objective rather than subjec-
tive; Grano asks whether persons of "ordinary firmness... would find the interrogation
pressures overbearing." See Grano, supra note 12, at 906. But this does not solve the
essential problem of how to define "overbearing" pressures.
164 For content of the warnings, see supra note 47.
165 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444; Y. KAMISAR, supra note 14, at 88 (Mi-
randa did not try to "kill confessions"); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation
and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
62, 71 (1966) ("minimum condition for the exercise of autonomous choice is to tell the
suspect that he has a choice, that there is no legal obligation to talk"); Schrock, Welsh, &
Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53
(1978) (silence notification is "necessary condition to free and rational choice").
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Miranda is normally read to create a legal presumption that all
confessions made to police interrogators in the absence of warnings
are coerced. 166 Our reading is that it indulges a presumption about
S's second-order volition and then creates a mechanism-the warn-
ings-by which the presumption can be rebutted. This may seem
like a small difference but it minimizes Joseph Grano's powerful cri-
tique of Miranda. Grano has argued that the Supreme Court lacks
the power to force state courts to apply Miranda because it is an
overinclusive legal presumption; if there is no coercion in a particu-
lar interrogation, the argument goes, the Supreme Court cannot
force a state court to reach the legal conclusion that coercion did
occur. 16
7
But a presumption about second-order volition is not a legal
conclusion. It is, instead, a presumption about a fact that can never
be known. This kind of presumption is inevitable if the self-incrimi-
nation clause is to be kept separate from due process fairness-with-
out some mechanism for courts to be able to determine when P
displaces S's will it is meaningless to talk about compelled self-in-
crimination. Assumptions ultimately must be made either about S's
will or about the legal consequences of what P does. Grano under-
stands Miranda to make the latter assumption, but it is possible that
the Court made the former.
Our reading of Miranda also makes its "waiver" aspect more
satisfying. Some have criticized Miranda for creating a legal pre-
sumption that police interrogation is inherently coercive and yet
permitting uncounseled suspects to waive the Miranda rights in re-
sponse to a police request.' 68 Under our view of Miranda, there is
no inconsistency. When S answers questions after receiving warn-
ings, she is not "waiving" anything; 69 rather, the warnings assure
that she is acting in accordance with her second-order volition; thus,
her response is not compelled.
166 See Schulhofer, supra note 119, at 446-53 (approving presumption); Grano, Rhode
Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions,
17 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 1, 42 (1979) (noting "legally dubious underpinnings" of Miranda's
"inherent compulsion rationale"); Markman, supra note 23, at 215 (characterizing the
Miranda presumption of coercion as "simply a fiction").
167 See Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1985).
168 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting) (asking "how can the
Court ever accept [S's] negative answer to the question of whether he wants to consult
his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?"); Burt, Loving Big Brother:
Comments on Seidman, Police Interrogation, and the Fifth Amendment, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMANrMES
181, 187-88 (1990).
169 Indeed, how could one ever "waive" the right not to be compelled? See Benner,
supra note 46, at 153 n.416.
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Action that is in accord with second-order volition is not com-
pelled even when inherently coercive forces are present. To use one
of Frankfurt's examples, a pilot who complies with a hijacker's de-
mand to fly to Cuba may, in fact, fly to Cuba because he wants to see
his mistress rather than to avoid being shot. If that is true, Frankfurt
concludes that the pilot acts freely. 170 Similarly, S acts freely while
in police custody if the reason he talks to the police is that his sec-
ond-order volition is not inconsistent with wanting to want to talk to
them. 17
1
Miranda's strength is that it returned the focus to what neces-
sarily must be at the heart of a compulsion inquirym-the will of the
suspect. It rejected both the reliability of the confession and due
process fairness as tests of coercion. Miranda is thus the natural out-
growth of the 1897 Brain focus on the suspect's choice to confess.
Indeed, the Brain choice ideology began to appear in the due pro-
cess cases prior to Miranda;172 this is significant because a guarantee
of due process does not inevitably entail free choice. That the Brain
ideology survived Wigmore's attack and manifested itself in the due
process cases suggests that its free choice "principle captures im-
portant underlying values which the 'reliability' and [fairness] tests
do not . . "173
To conclude that Miranda is consistent with second-order voli-
tion ideology is not, of course, to conclude that it was correctly de-
cided. The empirical evidence, while sketchy and sometimes based
on questionable methodology, 174 suggests only a slight decrease in
170 See H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 52.
171 This would be true even ifS is legally incompetent to stand trial. S can want his
volition to be to want to confess regardless of his competency. Thus, under this account
of coercion, Connelly could waive his Miranda rights and freely confess as long as he
understood that he did not have to talk. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161-62
(1986). Contra id. at 172-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (noting suspect's right to a
"freely self-determined" confession); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944)
(test is whether suspect retained "mental freedom" to decide whether to confess).
173 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 120-2 1. See al6 Van Kessel, supra note 14, at
17-19 (noting English courts' similar substitution of "free will" test for reliability test).
This is precisely how an ideology maintains itself-by influencing the thinking at a level
of unquestioned assumption. If one begins with the premise that second-order volition
must be respected, then the "mental freedom" focus of the due process cases, is an
inevitable result. But it would not be so for Wigmore.
174 One problem for the time studies that measure the confessions rate before and
after Miranda is the small size of the sample of suspects who were given substantially
complete Miranda warnings. Moreover, most studies measured Miranda's impact by in-
terviewing the group of interrogated suspects and categorizing their responses. These
studies require us to assume the accuracy of the information provided the researcher
and the accuracy of the categorization. Other studies assume that the police gave effec-
tive warnings in all cases. When coupled with a small sample size, any of these method-
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confessions in the wake of Miranda.1 75 Indeed, one of the peculiari-
ties of the debate over Miranda is that its proponents often argue
that the effect on confessions is minimal and thus that it is not very
Costly. 17 6 While this argument might be "good politics" in the
sense that it makes Miranda easier for the Wigmorians to swallow, it
threatens to make Miranda internally incoherent. If suspects do not
have a second order volition that is inconsistent with answering
questions during custodial interrogation, then Miranda's warnings
are unnecessary. But if interrogation-room confessions are incon-
sistent with the second-order volition of many suspects, then a "so-
lution" to this choice denial that fails to produce different choices is
to be decried rather than extolled. 77
A second-order volition account facilitates understanding why
Miranda might be ineffective. Empirical evidence suggests that
some suspects do not understand the warnings; 178 in that case, the
presumption that they want their will to be not to want to answer is
not rebutted. This implies a defect in the remedy that could be
cured by clarifying or expanding the warnings.' 79 Similarly, it may
ological problems is quite serious. See Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 148 (22 suspects);
Leiken, supra note 99 (50 suspects); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interroga-
tion in our Nation's Capitok The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REV. 1347 (1968)
(26 suspects); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PrTr.
L. REV. 1 (1967) (75 in one sample and 173 in another); Project, Interrogations in New
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1550-51 (1967) [hereinafter Project,
Interrogations] (50 suspects).
175 See Driver, supra note 97, at 60-61 (drawing conclusion of ineffectiveness from two
empirical studies); Leiken, supra note 99, at 47 (concluding that "the impact of Miranda
... seems to have been effectively neutralized"); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note
174, at 1373 (showing almost identical percentage of statements pre- and post-Miranda);
Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 174, at 12 & 13 (declines of 16% and 21% in confession
rate); Project, Interrogations, supra note 174, at 1565 (warned suspects in sample con-
fessed more frequently than unwarned suspects).
176 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 166, at 455-60 (noting, id. at 460, the "irony" in
making this argument on behalf of Miranda).
177 The Miranda dissents darkly predicted that many suspects would exercise the
choice given them by the warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). See also 1957 HOUSE COMMrrrEE HEAR-
INcS 37 (statement of Police Chief Murray) (if a suspect is warned, "I don't think he is
going to tell us very much"). Some continue to believe that effective Miranda warnings
would mean an end to confessions. See Grano, supra note 12 at 914 ("The most sophisti-
cated defendant, aware of his prerogatives and capable of assessing accurately the bene-
fits and costs of his choices, obviously will choose not to confess.").
178 See Leiken, supra note 99, at 14-16 (although all suspects read or were read the
rights warnings, 45% thought that an oral statement could not be used against them in
court, and 7% thought that a suspect "must tell the police everything about the alleged
offense and answer all of their questions").
179 Far from expanding the warnings, the Rehnquist Court seems prepared to weaken
them. See Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (upholding warnings that can be read
as promising advice of counsel only if the accused goes to court).
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be that suspects do not benefit from the information contained in
the warnings because the police deliver them in an ineffective man-
ner or because police are perceived as adversaries who will not
honor the promises in the warnings. 18 0 The requirement that police
give the warnings has been justifiably criticized because the interests
of the police are always contrary to S's second order volition not to
want her will to be to want to answer.181 If this somewhat quirky
aspect of Miranda can be empirically demonstrated to be a substan-
tial factor in causing suspects to ignore the warnings, it would re-
quire a solution because the original problem would have been
recreated-ineffective warnings would not rebut the Miranda sec-
ond-order volition presumption.
It remains true, we believe, that some presumption must be
made about the will of a suspect who is undergoing interrogation.
Miranda made one kind of presumption, but the opposite presump-
tion could be made-that suspects have (or easily acquire) a second-
order volition to want their will to be to want to answer questions.
This volition might be part of a more general will to want to tell the
truth. Or it could be that suspects typically ignore Miranda warnings
because they believe they can outsmart the police interrogator;18 2 in
these cases, S's second-order volition is to want her will to be to
want to provide answers, albeit not to confess, and the act of an-
swering questions is not compelled. If these categories encompass
most suspects, S's response to non-abusive interrogation could
manifest a second-order volition to want her will to be to want to
answer questions. We could then agree with Wigmore that almost
all responses to police interrogation are freely given.
On the other hand, the fundamental problem may be that Mi-
randa did not go far enough, that the flaw lies in its choice ideology
assumption that S has (or is capable of acting on) a preference about
answering questions.18 3 Indeed, suspects may have a fixed third-or-
180 See Ellis, supra note 66, at 856; Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 174, at 1374;
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 959; Project, Interrogations, supra note 174, at
1571-72.
181 See, e.g. Driver, supra note 97, at 59-61 (arguing that the warnings may even en-
courage confessions); Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 148, at 309-10 (observing that Mi-
randa may "require a capacity for schizophrenia as a qualification for the job [of police
interrogator]").
182 A classic example of this attitude is given in Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note
174, at 1378: "I wouldn't want a lawyer [in the interrogation room]. That's the worst
place to have a lawyer because the police play it straight then. I wanted them to make a
mistake." (Emphasis in original.)
183 Compare Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, supra note 174 at 1370 (Miranda presup-
poses that humans will act in their own self-interest as John Stuart Mill posited) with Dix,
supra note 16, at 237 (concluding that "the Court's approach in Miranda was seriously,
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der volition that overcomes any second-order volition not to want to
want to answer questions.1 8 4 For example, suspects may answer be-
cause silence is "highly dysfunctional for a person in an ambiguous
situation such as that presented by arrest." 185 Police, after all, rep-
resent authority, and most suspects may be incapable of defying au-
thority regardless of their volition about answering questions.'
8 6 If
the typical suspect does not have or cannot act on a volition to not
want to want to answer, it is incoherent to talk about choice denial in
police interrogation. Instead, we must talk about the normative
question of whether police should be permitted to create second-
order volition or capitalize on third-order volition that leads to con-
fessions. This is not a coercion inquiry at all if coercion is under-
stood to mean the displacing of S's will.1
8 7
One could conclude that police "preference creations" are
wrong under a due process fairness rubric or even under an ex-
panded, normative theory of coercion. 188 If easily-manipulated sus-
pects are to be protected from police "preference creations," the
interrogation environment would have to be radically changed. It
would not be enough to facilitate exercise of the suspect's volition-
as Miranda sought to do-for this ideological position presupposes
that suspects are manipulated into having a volition consistent with
confessing. If this position is accepted, and a remedy thought nec-
essary, courts could require the presence of counsel during police
interrogation or simply forbid the introduction of any statement ob-
tained by the police through interrogation.
perhaps fundamentally, flawed" because "the Court did not forsee that suspects would
fail to cooperate in its attempt to bring lawyers into the interrogation process"). See also
Griffith & Ayres, supra note 148, at 318-19 (concluding that the warnings are "only a
palliative" that are "an unhappy way-station and decidedly inadequate as a journey's
end").
184 H. FRANKFURT, supra note 18, at 21 ("a person may have, especially if his second-
order desires are in conflict, desires and volitions of a higher order than the second").
185 Driver, supra note 97, at 57. See also Jayne, The Psychological Principles of Criminal
Interrogation, in F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS, 327, 332-45 (3d ed. 1986) (describing unconscious internal anxiety created by
denial of guilt in the face of police interrogation).
186 Burt, supra note 168, at 187 (noting "intricate blend of dominance and nur-
turance" that "stacks the deck toward 'willing' (though often 'resentful') submission");
Driver, supra note 97, at 44 & 59-61 (1968) (noting environmental control of interro-
gators and lack of self-confidence and self-assertiveness of typical suspect); Griffiths &
Ayres, supra note 148, at 315-16 (describing middle-class susceptibility to psychological
pressure to answer questions to avoid being perceived as "uncooperative" or "rude"
and noting that Miranda "states legal, not social, rules"); Leiken, supra note 99, at 21
(concluding that "a large part of our decisionmaking" is controlled by factors over
which we lack rational control).




Thus, Miranda is vulnerable from both sides of the ideological
spectrum. Suspects may have preferences regarding interrogation
that are contrary to the Miranda presumption, reinstating Wig-
more's ideology. Or suspects may lack the ability to act on prefer-
ences that the warnings seek to create or maintain, thus rendering
the warnings ineffective. Because the available, albeit problematic,
empirical evidence suggests little effect from Miranda, it is important
to obtain more satisfactory evidence to determine why it has been
ineffective. In the meantime, Miranda stands as a shining (if some-
what empirically fragile) testimonial to the right to make a choice
about self-condemnation. 18 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The self-incrimination clause is premised on a model of human
conduct that views us as free will actors with fixed, pre-existing pref-
erences-actors capable of exercising choice in the absence of coer-
cion. Thus, it provides a defendant the right to choose whether to
take the witness stand in his criminal case. But the right is broader
than that, for it also forbids the use of out-of-court statements when
the choice to speak was sufficiently constrained. How to find that
point is susceptible to no precise solution, as Aristotle's analysis of
voluntary conduct implies.
We have argued that Frankfurt's second-order volition account
of coercion explains Miranda and that this is a plausible account of
compulsion in the context of police interrogation. Wigmore's nar-
row view of compulsion is also plausible, as are the explicitly norma-
tive accounts of coercion. However, two reasons exist to prefer
Miranda's solution. First, the normative tests provide less specific
guidance for evaluating confessions than Miranda because they de-
pend on identifying standards of moral conduct in the often morally
ambiguous enterprise of solving crime. Second, if the Miranda ide-
ology is even barely plausible, if it is possible that custodial police
interrogation routinely causes a suspect to confess when that is in-
consistent with her highest-order volition, the universe of all state-
ments produced by irresistible pressure (as Wigmore defined it)
could be much smaller than the universe of coerced statements.
Thus, to adopt the Wigmore ideology would be to risk admitting
many coerced statements. Adherence to the Miranda ideology, in
sum, makes it less likely that courts would inadvertently admit co-
erced statements under a vague normative test or a narrow Wig-
189 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 1045 ("Miranda, whatever its origi-




The Miranda ideology seeks a broad protection from external
influences that cause suspects to act contrary to their second-order
volition in the interrogation room. Whether its underlying pre-
sumption about the second-order volition of suspects can be main-
tained in the face of the empirical evidence of Miranda's
ineffectiveness is a question yet to be answered.
190 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (noting that "any doubt as to
whether the confession was voluntary must be determined in favor of the accused");
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 135-36 (noting that
difficulty of proving coercion requires a rule that prevents inadvertent admission of in-
voluntary confessions).
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